North Korea’s Eighth Party Congress Reveals Kim’s Goals

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un delivers a speech on the 76th anniversary of the country’s founding in Pyongyang, North Korea, September 9, 2024. File photo by KCNA/EPA-EFE

Jan. 2 (UPI) — The December 29, 2024 plenary session of the Eighth Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) was billed as a grand showcase of North Koreaachievements and a roadmap for its future. Under the direction of Kim Jong UnThe session ostensibly celebrated remarkable progress in national development and detailed an ambitious agenda for 2025. However, a closer look reveals the enduring priorities of the Kim family regime: perpetuating its authority, consolidating ideological control and the strategic exploitation of external tensions to justify internal difficulties. The plenary session’s rhetoric and policies underscore the regime’s unwavering focus on survival and domination at the expense of genuine progress and well-being of the North Korean people.

The illusion of progress and stability

The plenary report highlighted successes in various areas, including agriculture, industrial production and housing construction. He emphasized increasing production parameters and infrastructure achievements, such as the completion of 10,000 apartments in Pyongyang and the construction of rural villages. These achievements have been presented as proof of North Korea’s resilience and the leadership’s commitment to improving people’s lives.

Yet these proclamations mask the underlying economic struggles, systemic inefficiencies, and contradictions inherent in the mythical “Socialist Workers’ Paradise.” Despite claims of bumper agricultural harvests and industrial growth, North Korea’s economy remains hobbled by international sanctions, limited access to modern technology and a lack of foreign investment. The session’s emphasis on self-rule and independence, while ideologically significant, continues to isolate the country and exacerbate economic woes. The emphasis on symbolic achievements, such as housing projects and modernization initiatives, serves as propaganda to bolster the regime’s image rather than addressing the structural problems plaguing the nation.

Militarization and perpetuation of hostility

A central theme of the plenary session was national security and defense, reflecting the continued priority given to militarization. Kim Jong Un’s rhetoric emphasized the need to prepare the North Korean People’s Army as a revolutionary force, emphasizing advancements in defense technology and military capabilities. The session presented strategies to strengthen deterrence and warfighting capabilities through accelerated advancements in defense science and radical development of the munitions industry.

This militaristic posture aligns with North Korea’s long-standing strategy of political warfare and diplomatic blackmail. By presenting external powers – notably the United States and its allies – as existential threats, the regime justifies the emphasis placed on military preparation and the sacrifices demanded of its population. This narrative also distracts from internal failures by externalizing blame and fostering a siege mentality among its citizens.

Ideological control and militarization of difficulties

The plenary session reaffirmed the regime’s use of ideological indoctrination as a tool of governance. Kim Jong Un’s emphasis on the principle of “people first” and his slogans such as “Everything for the people and counting on them” underscore the regime’s efforts to portray itself as the protector of the Korean people. Simultaneously, the regime uses rhetoric about external threats to justify the population’s suffering, presenting sacrifices as necessary for national survival.

This strategy serves to maintain control over a population burdened by economic stagnation and resource scarcity. By combining ideological reinforcement with promises of eventual prosperity, the regime seeks to maintain its grip on power despite growing internal discontent. The emphasis on ideological work within the military and civilian sectors further reinforces loyalty with the intention of suppressing dissent and preventing political resistance. This indicates that Kim Jong Un fears the North Korean people more than the military of South Korea and the United States.

Diplomatic isolation and strategic calculations

The tone of the foreign relations session was, predictably, combative. The Workers’ Party has identified the United States, Japan and South Korea as adversaries, calling their nuclear bloc alliance an aggression. Although the plenary report hinted at the possibility of proactive external activities, it is clear that the regime’s main objective is to exploit tensions to obtain political and economic concessions.

This approach reflects Kim Jong Un’s strategy of “blackmail diplomacy,” in which increased provocations are used to force political and economic concessions through negotiations. However, the regime’s misjudgment of its influence – particularly in the face of the unwavering positions of the United States and its allies – led to prolonged isolation. Without substantial policy changes, North Korea is unlikely to make significant diplomatic breakthroughs, which would further strain its economy and international standing.

The report does not address Kim Jong Un’s renewed and growing relationship with Vladimir Putin and North Korean troops fighting for Russia to bring money to the regime. Based on estimated Russian payments in North Korea, this business likely provides Kim with more funds than his illicit activities and global cyber operations. This will help maintain the regime for the near future or as long as Putin’s term in office War in Ukraine continues.

Understanding the Kim Family Diet’s Goals and Strategy

The December 2024 plenary session of the Eighth Party Congress underscores the Kim regime’s unwavering commitment to its core goals: survival, control and domination. While the rhetoric of the session celebrates achievements and projects optimism, the reality is one of persistent internal challenges and international isolation. The regime’s emphasis on militarization, ideological indoctrination, and external scapegoating reveals a leadership more concerned with maintaining its grip on power than fostering real progress or caring for the well-being of his people.

The session provides the world with a better understanding of the nature, goals and strategy of the Kim family regime, which is expected to inform all future policies and strategies of the ROK/US alliance as well as civil society from all over the world who wish to support the Korean regime. the people of the north and the universal human right to self-determination of government.

Conclusion

As North Korea enters 2025, the gap between the regime’s ambitions and its realities will likely widen, posing significant risks to regional stability and the well-being of its citizens. The international community must remain vigilant, balancing deterrence, pressure and engagement to meet the challenges posed by a regime entrenched in its quest for absolute control and ideological purity.

The future longevity of the regime cannot be predicted and seven decades of survival seems to indicate a high level of regime resilience. This can continue to get byor he could decide to execute his campaign plan to try to unify the peninsula by force. Or it could be on the path to internal instability and regime collapse which could happen gradually, then all at once, a bit like we have just seen in Syria.

Whatever the future of the Kim family regime, there is only one lasting and acceptable political arrangement that ends nuclear threats and crimes against humanity: a free and unified Korea. This is what the Korean people, with the support of the international community, should focus on: the creation of a new Korea, a United Republic of Korea (UROK).

David Maxwell is a retired U.S. Army Special Forces colonel who spent more than 30 years in the Asia-Pacific region. He specializes in Northeast Asian security affairs and irregular, unconventional and political warfare. He is vice president of the Center for Asia-Pacific Strategy and a senior fellow at the Global Peace Foundation. After retirement, he served as associate director of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. He is a board member of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea and the OSS Society and is editor-in-chief of the Small Wars Journal.